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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

BLAINE L. PETTINGILL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

8077

RAY B. PERKINS,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF F:ACTS.
Plaintiff appeals from the verdict of the Jury and
the judgment entered thereon in favor of the defendant,
no cause of action.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages
for the death of his infant son, Keith W. Pettingill, who
was struck by an automobile operated by the defendant in
front of the Pettingill home in Clearfield, Utah on the
22nd of July, 1952. The child was of the age of two years.
The plaintiff contends that the verdict of the Jury
and the judgment entered thereon are not supported by
the evidence and are contrary to the evidence. It is,
therefore, necessary to review the evidence.
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Billie Mae Harris testified that she is a sister of
Mrs. Pettingill and together they were sitting on the
lawn in front of the Pettingill home at the time of the
accident (Tr. 4). Keith had crossed the road to play with
his two brothers and a boy by the name of R.oland Rich.
The deceased, in his play, was filling a bucket \vith sand
(Tr. 5). The child had been sitting on the lawn playing
in the sand that lies immediately west of and next to the
lawn. There was approximately seven or eight feet of
sand between the hard-surface portion of the road and
the lawn and the child was playing where the sand meets
the lawn. Three other children were playing with him.
They were Blaine Clark, 4 years of age, Dennis Clark, 6
years of age, and R-oland Rich, who was standing with
his bicycle ( Tr. 6). The witness, Mrs. Harris, was feeding her baby and glanced up just in time to see the child
struck. At that time the child was three feet out into the
road from the east edge of the hard surface, when the
car struck him at the right front fender. Keith rolled
under the car. The witness yelled at the defendant, but
the car didn't stop until it had gone eighty-five feet. The
child was picked up two feet behind the rear wheel of
the defendant's automobile. When the car stopped, the
defendant got out and said, "What have I done" (Tr. 7).
Prior to the collision the witness heard no horn sound.
The car appeared to go directly north and did not swerve.
The home is not located in the business section and the
only cars that pass in front of the ho1ne are those belonging to people living in the area (Tr. 8). The witness was
shown plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B", which, she testi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
fied, correctly show the street, as of the time of the accident. The Rich home, in front of which the children were
playing in the sand, is directly across the road from the
Pettingill lawn ( Tr. 9). Looking north from the corner
of Center Street along Third North one can see three and
a half blocks and at that time there was no obstruction
to vision on the highway for the whole distance (Tr. 10).
On cross-examination, Mrs. Harris testified that she
and Mrs. Pettingill had been sitting in front of the Pettingill home on the lawn approximately an hour before
the accident occurred and that the child, Keith, had just
gone over across the street for the first time shortly before the accident. Prior to that time he had been playing
in the sand on the west side of the road, the side on which
the Pettingill horne is located ( Tr. 11). The mother of
the child knew that the child had crossed the street. The
mother of the child was sitting on the lawn, facing the
west, with her back to the street (Tr. 12). The child was
sitting in the sand immediately next to the lawn and
seven or eight feet east from the edge of the hardsurface portion of the road (Tr. 12-13). Very few automobiles pass the Pettingill residence. Probably one every
thirty minutes (Tr. 13). The accident happened about
. six o'clock. The road is used oftener than one car every
half hour. The point of impact was approximately three
feet west of the east edge of the hard surfaced part- of
the road. The witness had no opinion as to the speed the
defendant was traveling and that it could possibly be
ten miles per hour. The car was going slowly and left no
brake or skid marks ( Tr. 15). Mrs. Pettingill had her
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back to the road and couldn't have seen the child struck
(Tr. 16). Witness couldn't tell whether the child was
running or walking. He was carrying a bucket full of
sand in his little hand (Tr. 17). The witness stated that
at the time of the accident she gave a statement that the
baby jumped up and ran across the road and was hit
by the coming car and that the man did not know that he
had hit the boy, but that she couldn't say whether or not
he was running because she didn't know (Tr. 18). That
at the time of the accident the child was going directly
west (Tr. 19). The street in front of the Pettingill home,
300 East Street, is a two-lane road (Tr. 20). When the
witness saw Keith before the accident the child was not
in the traveled portion of the road but was seven or eight
feet east of the edge of the road next to the lawn. A few
seconds later the witness looked up and saw the child
walking toward her and the car hit him. She observed
the child just before the car struck him, but she had not
observed the car prior to that time (Tr. 21). On redirect examination the witness testified that plaintiff's
Exhibit "B" shows the children on the edge of the highway in the same positions that they were in at the time
the accident happ·ened and that the same is true of plaintiff's Exhibit "A" (Tr. 22). There were no cars parked
on tlie east side of the highway in the whole block. There
were no weeds or shrubs growing out in the highway.
Looking north fron1 the corner of ·Center Street you could
see the children from that point (Tr. 23). The child
standing in the street in Exhibit "B" is standing where
the deceased was struck at the tilne of the accident (Tr.
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24). On re-cross examination the witness te-stified that
the child was not moving in a crouched position (Tr. 26).
Dennis Pettingill was then sworn and testified on
behalf of the plaintiff. The witness was seven years old.
Roland Rich is seven years old and was standing by his
bicycle. The Inother told the witness to watch Keith and
thereupon the witness went across the street to where
the child was playing (Tr. 28). The witness did not see
Keith get hit. All he saw was when Keith got half way
out in the middle of the road he saw him tumble underneath the car. He was rolled underneath the car (Tr. 29).
Tlie witness went across the street with Keith. Keith returned with some sand in a bucket and dumped it and
then went back across the street again (Tr. 30). The
mother told the witness he could go across the street to
play and told Keith he could go also (Tr. 31).
Eunice Rich was then sworn and testified for the
plaintiff. The witness was a nurse and neighbor, living
directly across the street from the Pettingills. At the
time of the accident she was standing in her driveway,
facing in a northerly direction, talking to a Mrs. Chard,
who was sitting in an automobile in the driveway of the
Rich home (Tr. 32). The witness heard an impact and
screaming. She thereupon turned around and saw an
object rolling under the car which she thought was a
dog, but when she looked again she saw the dog running
behind the car, so she knew the object under the car must
be a child (Tr. 33). The street in front of her home is
300 East Street and isn't highly traveled (Tr. 36).
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Mrs. Irene Pettingill testified that the deceased was
twenty-six months old at the time of his death (Tr. 40).
The little boy shown standing in Exhibits "A" and "B"
was placed where Keith was at the time he was hit
( Tr. 43). Exhibits "A" and "B" were offered and received. At the corner of Center Street on 300 East there
was a traffic sign showing the picture of a child playing
on it with the figures ten miles an hour. The witness had
her back kind of turned to the road, but was turned so
that she could keep the children in sight. When Keith
wanted to go across the street and play with the children
over there the witness felt there was no harm in it and
let him go. She watched hin1 cross the street and told
her son Dennis to keep an eye on his brother, and the
last she remembers he was sitting on the lawn filling
his bucket with sand. She had just turned from looking
at the children when she heard her sister yell. She looked
up and the child was rolling under the car (Tr. 44). She
jumped up· and ran after the car and yelled at the driver.
After the car stopped the driver got out and asked what
he had done, and the witness told him he had run over
her baby and killed him. The child was then taken to the
house and Mrs. Rich called a doctor and an ambulance
and the child was taken to the hospital, where he died a
couple of hours later (Tr. 45). The witness identified
Exhibit "C" as a picture of the deceased taken about
ten days before the child was killed (Tr. 46).
On cross examination Mrs. Pettingill testified that
she was seated on her lawn with her back to the road and
that ~she could look and see Keith from that position.
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She did not see the car coming before the accident
occurred (Tr. 47). The baby had been on the opposite
side of the road just a few minutes before the accident
occurred, probably fifteen minutes (Tr. 48). When the
baby crossed the street he did so alone and she did not
feel it was dangerous to allow the child to cross the street
alone when there was no car in sight. He had walked
across the street a dozen times. The witness felt that it
was dangerous for the child to walk across the street if
she was not there. She had cautioned him about not going
across the street and had asked Dennis to watch him.
The last time she saw Keith sitting on the lawn or on the
edge of the grass she felt he was in a safe position
(Tr. 50). Exhibits "A" and "B" were taken about the
same time of day that the baby was struck. They were
taken about three weeks after the accident ( Tr. 54).
On re-direct examination the witness testified that
the distance between their home and Center Street had
been stepped off and it was about 375 feet.
George Williams, father of Mrs. Pettingill, was then
sworn and testified that at the scene of the accident the
officer asked the defendant at what speed he was driving and he said about twenty miles an hour, whereupon
a little hoy came up from the corner and said that the
speed limit was ten miles an hour, and the defendant
said that he must have been traveling at about that speed
(Tr. 58, 59). He and the officer measured the distance
from where the bucket of sand had been to the place
where the car stopped and it was 85 feet (Tr. 60). A day
or two later he examined the defendant's automobile and
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there ·was a dent in the right front fender just above the
bumper where the boy's head had hit, the bumper had
blood on it, and there was a little hair around the dent
in the fender. The dent was about the size of a man's
head. The defendant told the witness that the dent
wasn't there the day before (Tr. 61). The sand which
apparently came from the bucket the child was carrying
was in the road at approximately the place where the
boy was standing in Exhibit "B".
The plaintiff testified that the deceased was his son.
On the day of the accident he was working at the Ogden
Arsenal and returned home at about 4:15 (Tr. 65). He
thereafter left and went to Arsenal Villa to do some
television repair work. He was adjusting an antenna on
a roof when Mr. Clark, a neighbor, drove up and said
his boy had had an accident. He immediately went to
the home and then to the hospital (Tr. 66). At the
hospital they told him the boy was dead (Tr. 67). Streets
running west from 300 North dead-end in 300 North.
There is very little traffic on 300 East and there are no
sidewalks on the street. People going to church and
school have to walk down the 1niddle of the street, which
is the common practice (Tr. 68). He saw the defendant's
automobile the day after the funeral. It was well kept
and the only dent in the fender was the dent where the
baby was hit. In the grill the baby's hand went in and
left some skin ( Tr. 71).
The plaintiff rested.
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The first witness called for the defendant was Richard L. Padgett. He stated that on the 22nd day of July,
1952 he was working part time in the Clearfield Police
Station and one of his duties was to investigate automobile accidents. He heard about the accident involved in
this case at 6:30 (Tr. 74). It was daylight when he arrived
at the scene of the accident. He observed no skid marks
on the pavement. The width of 300 East Street would
be close to 18 or 20 feet ( Tr. 75). The street had a hard
surface, oiled surface, with shoulders of sand. The
shoulders were approximately two feet in width, measured from the edge of the road to the crest. The defendant said he had been traveling ten miles an hour (Tr.
76). Mrs. Billie Mae Harris stated that the boy ran
across the street in front of the car and that the boy was
kind of leaning forward and running. Mrs. Harris
showed the witness where the child was struck. From
that point he measured to a point where he was shown
that the boy came to a stop. The measurement was
seventy-five feet ( Tr. 77). The witness testified that he
was acquainted with the area where the accident occurred
and the street is not traveled extensively or heavily (Tr.
80). Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B" are the approximate picture of the conditions at the time the accident
happened. The witness knew nothing of the individual~.
or automobiles shown in the picture (Tr. 82).
Mrs. Lorraine N. Perkins, wife of defendant, was
then called. She testified that she was riding in the front
seat of the car with her husband when the accident
occurred. There were five children in the car, four in
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the back seat and one in the front. The child in front
was a baby sitting on her lap. They entered 300 East
Street at Center Street. Her husband stopped before
entering 300 East Street at Center Street (Tr. 84). He
slowed down to turn the corner and then proceeded north
on Third East Street. The witness didn't see any children in the road as the car proceeded north. She stated
that she did not see a child at any time before the accident occurred. She heard the impact but did not know
what it was at the time. As soon as her husband hit
the child he put on his brakes and stopped immediately.
Her husband was driving at ten miles an hour (Tr. 85).
Some of the windows in the car were up and some were
down. As the car turned from Center Street into Third
East Street she looked down the street and didn't see any
children in the street, nor did she see a bicycle. The witness was shown plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and stated she
remembered the same as being 300 East Street (Tr. 87).
The little boy shown in Exhibit "A" was pointed out to
the witness. She stated that she could see him in the
picture but didn't see him that day. There were no
children on that day that she could see. She didn't see
any children at any time that day. She didn't see the
little boy that got hit. She knew that her husband was
not going over ten miles an hour because he just turned
the corner, shifting from first gear to second gear. She
did not look at the sp·eedometer, but she knew that the
defendant was not going over ten miles an hour. He
couldn't have been going over twelve miles an hour. He
couldn't have been going more than ten miles an hour
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(Tr. 88). She was asked whether her husband was going
eight 1niles. an hour and she stated 1naybe. She was asked
if he was going five miles an hour and she said he
wasn't going five miles an hour. She was asked if he
was going three miles an hour and she answered "No."
She was asked if he was going eleven and she answered
"No." She was asked if he was going exactly ten and
she answered "Yes." There ·were no cars parked between
the place of the a.cciden t and Center Street. She did not
hear the bump (Tr. 89). She heard something at the
back end which the car ran over and thought it was a dog
or something. Their car was not damaged before the
accident but was afterwards. The right front fender was
dented in about as big as a baby's head (Tr. 90).
The defendant, Ray B. Perkins, was then sworn
and testified. At the time of the accident he was driving
a 1935 Chevrolet four-door automobile (Tr. 95). He was
headed north on Third East when the accident occurred.
Just before. he entered Third East he had been driving
on Center Street (Tr. 96). He went a little past Third
East and had to back up and make the turn into Third
East. It was daytime and the sun was shining. As he
proceeded north on Third East he did not observe any
children on the street nor near the street. The first that
he knew that anything was wrong was when his back
wheels went over something. He did not know what it
was but he stopped his automobile and got out and
looked (Tr. 97). He stopped his automobile by putting
on the brakes in the usual manner. When he got out Mrs.
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Pettingill had the child in her arms. He asked what he
had done and she answered "You killed my child." As he
was driving up Third East Street he was looking straight
ahead, watching the road, at a rate of speed of ten miles
an hour, in second gear (Tr. 98). As he turned into Third
East from Center Street ~e could see three blocks ahead.
There was no obstruction in the street. The weather was
clear ( Tr. 91). There were no cars between the corner
of Center Street and where the collision occurred. There
were no cars parked on either side of the highway and
there were no cars coming on the highway or traveling
either way other than his automobile. He was shown
Exhibit "A" and stated that he could see the road as well
as it is shown in the picture and that Exhibit "A" and
Exhibit "B" are a fair view of what he could see, except
that there was nothing on the road at the time of the
accident ( Tr. 100). He did not see any children off to
the side where the bicycle is in the picture. The windows
in the car were down. He did not hear the collision
between the automobile and the child (Tr. 101). He did
not hear anyone scream or any noise outside. He did
not tell the officer that he was going between fifteen and
twenty miles an hour. He testified that he told the police
officer he was going ten miles an hour (Tr. 102). He was
asked if he recalled a boy saying something about the
speed limit sign which shows ten miles an hour. He
answered that he remembered that the boy said that ten
miles an hour was the speed limit (Tr. 103).
The plaintiff was recalled and testified that the
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street had been reoiled since the accident but was
approximately the sa1ne width as at the time of the accident. The rosebush shown in defendant's Exhibit 2 could
have been there on the day of the accident. Exhibit 2
was then offered and received.
~Ir.

S-. S. Taylor was then sworn and testified for
the defendant. He stated that he was a professional engineer, e1nployed by the Salt Lake City Traffic Engineering Staff (Tr. 105). The witness then testified as to his
experience (Tr. 106). Third East Street is _an oiled
street and is approximately eighteen feet in width. In
some places it narrows to sixteen feet and in other places
it widens to twenty feet. The outside width shoulder to
shoulder is twenty-nine to thirty feet in width (Tr. 109).
The west edge of a bush identified by the witness was
just a little east of a utility pole. The bush was identified
as the bush shown in defendant's Exhibit 2 (Tr. 112).
The witness was asked if there was a possibility that the
bush shown in the photograph could prevent a motorist
from seeing an object on the west edge of the lawn in
front of the Rich home, to which the witness gave the
answer "On the west edge of the lawn~" To which the
question was then asked "To where you saw it later"
and the answer was "Yes." (Tr. 113). The witness was
then asked the following question: "Based on your
experience and training, is it possible that a person driv-'
ing north on Third East in Clearfield after driving in
the sunlight and assume further that an object is situated
or located on your diagram, directly across from the
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Pettingill residence, on the west edge of the Rich home
in the shade, and, assume that the motorist has nor1nal
vision; I will ask you if it is a possibility that the shade
might camouflage or to some extent hide the presence of
that object~" Answer, "I think it might" (Tr. 114). The
rosebush mentioned by the witness is east of the pole
shown in the photograph. The west edge of the bush is
east of the pole shown in Exhibit "B" (Tr. 121). The pole
is about twelve feet from the edge of the lawn (Tr. 125).
The Jury rendered a general verdict in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action,
and found in answer to two special interrogatories: (1)
That the mother of Keith Pettingill was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributed to
the accident and resulting death of the child and (2) That
the defendant was operating his automobile at the rate
of ten miles per hour.
The evidence conclusively shows that the defendant
was negligent. The child was too young to be capable
of being contributorily negligent and the Court so instructed the Jury. Therefore, the only ground upon
which the Jury could have found in favor of the defendant was the contributory negligence of the mother of the
deceased. The ap·pellant confesses that appellant's counsel requested an instruction to the effect that the contributory negligence of the parents or either of them would
bar recovery. The Court instructed that the father was
not negligent but that the contributory negligence of the
mother would bar the action. This is not the law.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The appellant will present his case under five
points:
( 1) There was no evidence that the Inother of the
deceased was negligent.
(2) The negligence of the mother, if any, was
im1naterial.

The defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident.
(3)

The negligence of the defendant was the sole,
proximate cause of the accident and the resulting death
of the child.
( 4)

The evidence was insufficient to sustain the
verdict of the Jury and the judgment entered thereon,
and said verdict and judgment are not supported by the
evidence, are contrary to the evidence and contrary to
law.
( 5)

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE MOTHER OF
THE DECEASED WAS NEGLIGENT.

It must be remembered that 300 East Street was not
a much traveled road and the speed limit thereon was
ten miles an hour. The child was permitted to cross the
road while the mother and her sister were sitting on the
lawn directly across froin the child. The child was in
company with three other children and the seven-year
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old 'SOn was instructed to care for the child. A moment
or two before the accident occurred the mother was
watching the cliild and saw it sitting on the edge of the
lawn seven or eight feet east of the hard surfaced portion of the highway and ten feet east of the point of
collision. The children, including the deceased, were in
clear, unobstructed view of any motorist who might be
transversing the highway. Under such circumstances it
was not negligence for the mother to permit the child
to be across the road from where she was sitting.
In the case of Barker v. Savas, 172 Pac. 672, 52 Utah
262, a child of six years of age was killed while riding
a tricycle along R.edwood Road, one of the much travelled
highways of Salt Lake County. The defendant complained that the Court refused to instruct the Jury upon
the question of the contributory negligence of the child
and of his parents, because the defendant had not
pleaded contributory negligence. The Court reviewed
the evidence and stated that the father could not have
been guilty of contributory negligence and said concerning the negligence of the mother that she permitted the
boy to follow other boys with a pony down Redwood Road
to the cemetery and that she carefully watched him to
that point and saw him turn and start for home. The
Court said:
"Certainly there is not a scintilla of evidence
in the record that any negligence of the plaintiff
(the father) contributed to the injury complained
of. Neither was there any negligence on the part
of the mother. If the jury in this case had ren-
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dered a special verdict and found against the
plaintiff on the grounds of contributory negligence of any of the parties concerned and the
question was presented to this Court for review,
we would feel it our duty to reverse the cause on
that ground alone."
A co1nparison of these two cases will disclose that
there was more ground for finding negligence of the
mother in Barker vs. Sa,vas than in the case at bar.

POINT TWO
THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, OF THE
MOTHER WAS IMMATERIAL.

The law is that the contributory negligence of the
mother in an action brought by the father for the death
of their child is irrunaterial. The law on the question of
the contributory negligence of a beneficiary in an action
brought under the wrongful death statutes is discussed
in several A.L.R. annotations. The most recent and
exhaustive discussion of this matter is found in 2 A.L.R.
2d Series commencing at page 785. The law involving the
contributory negligence of one spouse in an action
brought by the other spouse for the wrongful death of a
child is discussed at page 805 of 2 A.L.R. 2d Series.
There the annotator says:
"Attention is called also to the fact that by
the great weight of modern authority the negligence of one spouse is not imputed to the other
unless he or she is the agent of the other in the
matter at hand or they are jointly engaged in the
prosecution of a common enterprise. See 38 Am.
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~ ur. 925, 926, Negligence, Section 239. From this

It follows that in an action against the third person for the death of a child the contributory negligence of one of the parents will not be imputable
to the other, so as to preclude recovery for or on
behalf of the parent who was not negligent merely
because of their relation as husband and wife and
absent any partnership, joint undertaking or community of interest."
The jurisdictions which hold that the contributory
negligence of the mother is a bar to an action by the
father do so upon the basis that one spouse is the agent
of the other spouse in the ca.re of the children or, as in the
community property states, any recovery would in effect
be for the benefit of the negligent spouse. This Court has
repudiated the doctrine of agency existing between parents simply because of the marriage relationship. In the
case of Conklin vs. Walsh, 193 Pac. (2d) 437, 113 Utah
276, the defendant argued that since Mrs. Conklin was
taking her child to a music lesson she was acting as agent
for the husband in the care and education of the child,
and, therefore, her negligence should be imputed to Dr.
Conklin. This Court held, following Fox vs. Lavendar,
89 Utah 115, 56 Pac. (2) 1049, that there was no agency
relationship between Mrs. Conklin and Dr. Conklin in
the care of the child and the negligence of Mrs. Conklin
was not imputable to Dr. Conklin.
In the case of Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad
Compa111J vs. Umbaugh, 123 (2d) 224, 61 Nev. 214, the
Court discussed the question at length and therein states,
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quoting with approval from McDonald vs. O'Reilly (45
Or. 589, 78 Pac. 753, 754) as follows:
"But the contributory negligence which will
bar recovery must be that of the person from
whon1 the cause of action is derived or the beneficiary, or son1eone standing in such relation to
the beneficiary that the maximum 'qui facit per
aliu1n· facit per se' may be invoked. A wife does
not from the mere marital relation, however,
occupy such a position in the care and custody of
a minor child. Under our statute, the right and
responsibility of the parents in that regard are
equal, and the 1nother is as fully entitled to the
custody and care of the children as the father.
* * * The doctrine to be found in some of the
books, therefore, that because the father is the
legal custodian of the children, or because of the
identity of the parents, the law will assume that
the mother is the agent of the father, for whose
negligence he is responsible, can have no application. A mother is not the agent of the father in
the care of the children, any more than the father
is the agent of the mother. They are both equal
before the law. The common interest or common
duty of the parents toward the children will not
of itself make one the agent of the other or responsible for that other's negligence. Such seems
to be the result of the decided cases in cases where
the doctrine of imputed negligence is not recognized."
The following cases are in point: Lakeview Inc. vs.
Davidson, 26 Pac. (2d) 760, 166 Okla. 171; Phillip-s vs.
Denver City Tramway Company, 128 Pac. 460, 53 Colo.
458; Herrell vs. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, 23 S.W. (2d) 102, 324 Mo. 38, 69 A.L.R. 470.
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POINT THREE
THE DEFENDANT HAD THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE
TO AVOID THE A!CCIDENT.

The evidence is conclusive that the defendant had a
clear, unobstructed view of the children from the time
he left Center Street to the point of the collision, a distance of 375 feet. Appellant respectfully requests the
Court to carefully examine plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and
"B". Defendant and his wife both testified that they were
travelling ten miles an hour. The Jury, in answer to a
special interrogatory, found the fact to be so. At such
speed he had a clear, unobstructed view of the children
for more than twenty-five seconds. He said he did not
see the ·children. It was his duty to keep a constant lookout in operating his automobile and particularly in view
of the fact that the traffic sign which he had just passed
indicated that children would probably be playing along
the street and the speed limit was ten miles per hour. It
being his duty to see the children, he is considered in law
to have seen the children. As was stated in Palmer vs.
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 34 Utah 423, 98
Pac. 689, 700:
"If a duty is cast upon one to loo~, then in
contemplation of law, he also sees, whether in fact
he does so or not. What one ought to see, he as a
matter of law does see."
On the same page the Court said:
"Under such circumstances, however, the
ability to see was, in the eye of the law, tantamount to seeing. The negligence, in such event,
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would consist in not seeing what ought to have
been seen, and the fact whether he saw or not,
would not be controlling-in fact not even essential."
As the Court said in Richards vs. Palace LaU<ndry
Company, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 439:
"This Court is firrnly comrnitted to the rule
just stated, narnely, that in case there is a duty
owing to the plaintiff to maintain a lookout, then,
if the person charged with causing the injury in
the exercise of ordinary care and vigilance could
have discovered the p·erilous situation of the complainant in time to have averted injuring him, the
law presumes that the person charged with negligence saw what he ought to have seen and actual
discovery is not necessary."
Concerning the duty of one driving an automobile
under such circumstances the Court in Barker vs. Savas,
Supra, 52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672, said, referring to the
defendant:
"He was behind the deceased with nothing
to obscure or obstruct his vision. If he had looked
ahead, as was his duty to do, there was nothing
to prevent his seeing the deceased in time to avoid
the collision. That it was his duty to look ahead
in the exercise of reasonable care, in cases of this
kind, is so generally recognized as a legal duty as
to be beyond all controversy. Indeed, the doctrine
is elementary."
It is very difficult to believe the defendant and his
wife when they testified that they did not see the children. The willingness of the defendants to testify to
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such fact is characterized by the testilnony of the wife
of the defendant that although she did not look at the
speedometer, she was certain that the automobile was
not going over ten miles an hour. She was asked if the
defendant was going eleven miles an hour and she
answered no. She was asked if he was going exactly ten
miles and she answered yes.
Mrs. Eunice Rich, who was standing in the driveway
of her home some distance from the point of collision,heard the impact and heard the screams of Mrs. Pettingi~l
and Mrs. Harris, who were on the opposite side of the
street from her. The defendant's automobile was between
Mrs. Rich and the other two women. Yet the defendant
testified that he did not hear the impact and did not hear
the screams of the women. The impact was sufficiently
hard to dent the front of the right fender. Defendant's
wife testified that she heard the impact but not the
screams of the women and that the defendant immediately stopped the automobile after the impact. The evidence is conclusive that the child was rolled under the
automobile a distance of seventy-five feet or more after
the impact and before the automobile stopped. The testimony of both the defendant and his wife is incredible.
If the defendant had been looking he must have seen,
and, as set forth. above, is charged with having seen the
child. Almost immediately before the impact the child
was seen sitting on the edge of the lawn seven or eight
feet east of the east edge of the hard surfaced portion of
the highway. The. impact occurred approximately three
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feet west of the east edge of the hard surfaced portion
of the highway. Therefore, in clear view of the defendant
was the child carrying a bucket of sand. He traveled a
distance of ten or eleven feet before he was struck by
the front of the car. Certainly the child could not have
been moving more than two or three miles an hour. The
defendant, traveling ten miles an hour, must have covered between thirty-three and fifty-five feet during the
ti1ne that the child traveled fro1n the edge of the grass to
the point of the i1npact. One driving an automobile at
ten miles an hour can stop the same in a distance of fifteen feet. The average reaction time is three-fourths of
a second. Defendants would have travelled approximately eleven feet during that time. An automobile
travelling ten miles an hour can be stopped in four or
five feet after the brakes are applied. The total reaction
and stopping distance would be approximately fifteen
feet. At the time the child started across the highway,
because of his age and inability to appreciate any danger, the child was helpless so far as taking care of itself.
At that time it was too late for the mother to have done
anything if she had been watching the child. The defendant had a clear opportunity to have avoided the collision.
This Court has discussed on several occasions the
law of last clear chance and has stated its adherence to
the rules of last clear chance as stated in R.esta tement of
the Law of Torts, Sec. 479 and 480. S.ee Compton vs.
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, 235 Pac. (2d)
515, ______ Utah ...... .
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The law as stated in Section 479 is to the effect that
a negligent defendant who saw or should have seen a
helpless plaintiff in time to avoid injuring him is liable
to the plaintiff. The rule as announced in Section 480 is
to the effect that a negligent defendant is liable to a
plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance,
could have observed the danger created by the defendant's negligence in time to have avoided harn1, provided
the defendant knew of the plaintiff's situation and realized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and, therefore, is unlikely to discover his peril in
time to avoid the harm. The difference between the two
sections is that if the plaintiff is helpless the defendant
is liable if he knew or should have known of the situation
of the plaintiff. In Section 480 ·the rule is stated that if
the plaintiff is not helpless but inattentive, the defendant
is liable only if he knew and realized or had reason to
realize that the plaintiff was inattentive.
The child, being only two years of age, was not
capable of being negligent and was, because of his age,
helpless to prevent the accident. Therefore, the rule announced in S·ection 479 should be operative even if we
assume that the defendant did not see the child. He was
under a duty to see the child in plenty of time to have
avoided the accident. Under the doctrine of last clear
chance, he was plainly liable. The following cases are in
point on this Inatter: Mingus vs. Ollsen, 201 Pac. (2d)
495, 114 Utah 505; Leinbach vs. Pickwick-Greyhound
Lines, 23 Pac. (2d) 449, 138 Kan. 56; Graham vs. John-
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son, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, 109 Utah 346; Compton vs. Ogd~en
Union Railway and D·epot, 235 Pac. (2d) 515, ------ Utah
...... ; Hyde vs. Union Pacific Railway Compa.ny, 26 Pae.

979, 7 Utah 356.

POINT FOUR
THE NEGLIGEN·CE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS THE
SOLE, PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE
CHILD.

The appellant relies upon the case of Barker vs.
Savas as discussed herein before upon this proposition.
There are other cases which reach the same conclusion under similar circumstances.
In the case of Hornbuckle vs. McCarty, 243 S. W.
327, 295 Mo. 162, the Court held that, if as the evidence
tended to show, the driver of the truck in the exercise of
ordinary care would have discovered the boy's perilous
position and his obliviousness of such peril in time, by
the exercise of ordinary diligence to have avoided the
collision, the driver's negligence, and not the boy's walking (or running) against the machine, was the juridical
cause of the latter's death.
In the same case the Court held that if the driver of
an automobile could, by the exercise of ordinary care,
have discovered the peril of one crossing the street in
such a manner as to be likely to come in contact with the
vehicle and who was oblivious of his danger in time to
have avoided the collision, his negligence in failing to do
so, and not that of the pedestrian in walking into the side
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of the vehicle, w~s held to be the proximate cause of the
InJury.
As the Court said in Chunn vs. City and Suburban
Railroad, 207 U.S. 302, 52 L.Ed. 219:
"Nor it it clear that even if the plaintiff was
not free from fault her negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. If she carelessly placed
herself in a position exposed to danger and it was
discovered by the defendant in time to have
avoided the injury by the use of reasonable care
on its part and the defendant failed to use such
care that failure might be found to be the sole
cause of the resulting injury."

POINT FIVE
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED THEREON, AND SAID VERDICT AND JUDGMENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, ARE
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.

F·or this point, the appellant relies upon the arguments hereinbefore made. Summarizing those arguments,
the appellant contends that he has established that the
defendant was negligent; the child was incapable of
negligence; the plain tiff was not guilty of contributory
negligence as instructed by the Court ; the mother of the
deceased was not .negligent and if she were, such negligence was immaterial; the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident; and the negligence of the
defendant was the sole, proximate cause of the accident.
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The appellant submits that in view of the foregoing
the trial Court should have granted a new trial and having failed to do so, the appellant is entitled to a reversal
of the judgment and a new trial of this action.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT IVERSON,
Attorney for Pla,intiff and
App~ellant.
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